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Alaska Lawyer Search - Listings for Christenson Keith Atty
Name: Christenson Keith Atty
Address: 15631 Chris Ct Eagle River, AK 99577
Phone Number: 907-696-5290
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Specialties:
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Real Estate Law
Civil Law
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Cases related to this attorney's specialties:
ISRAEL, DONALD v. US DEPT AGRICULTURE In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No. 01-1910 Donald and Patsy Israel, Richard and Shirley Quinton, all d/b/a Israel and Quinton Farms, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. United States Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 00 C 223-Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge. Argued October 23, 2001-Decided March 8, 2002 Before Harlington Wood, Jr., Cudahy, and Kanne Circuit Judges. Kanne, Circuit Judge. In 1989, plaintiffs restructured an existing loan with the Farm Service Agency ("FSA")/1 and signed a ten-year agreement as part of that restructuring. The agreement required plaintiffs to pay the FSA a percentage of appreciation that accrued to their property if certain triggering events transpired ("recapture"). In 1999, the FSA determined that expiration of the agreement was one of the triggering events and sought recapture. Plaintiffs sought administrative review of the FSA's determination and argued that only three events triggered recapture: full payment on the loan, cessation of farming, or transfer of the title of their property. The National Appeals Division of the Department of Agriculture found that the terms of the agreement allowed recapture at the expiration of the agreement. Plaintiffs appealed that decision to the Director of the National Appeals Division for the Department of Agriculture, who affirmed. Plaintiffs then sought judicial review of the agency's determinations and argued that they were arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and unsupported by substantial evidence. The district court affirmed, and plaintiffs appealed. We affirm. I. History A. Shared Appreciation Agreement Plaintiffs, Donald and Patsy Israel and Richard and Shirley Quinton, own a farming partnership called Israel and Quinton Farms. In the fall of 1989, plaintiffs were indebted to the FSA in the amount...
JOHANNS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, et al. v. LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 03-1164.Argued December 8, 2004-Decided May 23, 2005* The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act) establishes a federal policy of promoting and marketing beef and beef products. The Secretary of Agriculture has implemented the Act through a Beef Promotion and Research Order (Order), which creates a Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research Board (Beef Board) and an Operating Committee, and imposes an assessment, or "checkoff," on all sales and importation of cattle. The assessment funds, among other things, beef promotional campaigns approved by the Operating Committee and the Secretary. Respondents, associations whose members pay the checkoff and individuals whose cattle are subject to the checkoff, challenged the program on First Amendment grounds, relying on United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U. S. 405, in which this Court invalidated a mandatory checkoff that funded mushroom advertising. The District Court found that the Beef Act and Order unconstitutionally compel respondents to subsidize speech to which they object. Affirming, the Eighth Circuit held that compelled funding of speech may violate the First Amendment even when it is the government's speech. Held: Because the beef checkoff funds the Government's own speech, it is not susceptible to a First Amendment compelled-subsidy challenge. Pp. 5-15. (a) This Court has sustained First Amendment challenges in "compelled-subsidy" cases, in which the government requires an individual to subsidize a private message he disagrees with. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209. Keller and Abood led the Court to sustain a compelled-subsidy challenge to an assessment whose only purpose was to fund mushroom advertising. United Foods, supra, at 413, 415-416. However, the speech in United Foods...
SIERRA CLUB v. SEABOARD FARMS, INC. FILED United States Court of Appeals 1000 Tenth Circuit OCT 28 2004 PATRICK FISHER Clerk PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 03-6104 SEABOARD FARMS INC. and SEABOARD CORPORATION, Delaware corporations, and SHAWNEE FUNDING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Delaware partnership, Defendants-Appellees. TYSON FOODS INC., Amicus Curiae. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA (D.C. NO. CIV-00-997-C) Barclay B. Rogers (Patrick Gallagher and David Bookbinder with him on the briefs), Sierra Club, San Francisco, CA, for Appellant. Ellen B. Steen (Richard E. Schwartz and Kirsten L. Nathanson with her on the brief), Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellee. Judith A. Villines, Stites & Harbison, PLLC, Frankfort, Kentucky, and Laura D. Keller, James W. Taylor, and W. Blaine Early, Stites & Harbison, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky on the brief for Amicus Curiae. Before HENRY, BRISCOE, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges. HENRY, J., Sierra Club, Inc. appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants, Seaboard Farms Inc., Seaboard Corporation, and Shawnee Funding Limited Partnership (together, "Seaboard"), who own and operate a pig-farming operation in western Oklahoma. This case turns on the meaning of the word "facility" as used in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act's section 103(a) ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. 9603(a). CERCLA's Section 103(a) sets out various reporting requirements for the release of hazardous substances from a facility; here we focus on the ammonia emissions from Appellee's concentrated animal feeding operation located in western Oklahoma. CERCLA's statutory definition of this term is somewhat turbid, but, when read with other provisions nearby, is unambiguous. The district court found that the term "facility" should be narrowly construed so as to apply to each individ...
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